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RE-ESTABLISHING PRIORITY OF A
SUBORDINATED PURCHASE-MONEY
DEED OF TRUST
The agreement of a seller of land to subordinate his purchase-
money deed of trust to construction financing has received extensivejudicial treatment in a series of cases involving specific performance
of executory land sale contracts containing such subordination pro-
visions.' But the problems arising after execution of the land sale
contract have received scant attention. No case has been discovered
involving specific performance of an agreement to subordinate aris-
ing after the execution of the land sale contract. This is probably
due in large part to the popularity of the so-called "automatic" sub-
ordination clause and the widespread practice of including within or
endorsing upon seller's deed of trust a subordination agreement
which authorizes the trustee (usually a title company) to execute
the subordination. Neither practice requires any further affirmative
action on the part of seller to effect the subordination.
Four cases have been reported at the intermediate appellate
level involving the fully executed subordination.2 Despite the impor-
tance of the problems involved, the opinions in these four cases are
at best nebulous and unsatisfactory. The cases do contain some
elements of a determination of rights and liabilities, which will be
1 Cummins v. Gates, 235 Cal. App. 2d 532, 45 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965); Stockwell
v. Lindeman, 229 Cal. App. 2d 750, 40 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1964); Burrow v. Timmsen,
223 Cal. App. 2d 283, 35 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1963); Kessler v. Sapp, 169 Cal. App. 2d818, 338 P.2d 34 (1959); Roven v. Miller, 168 Cal. App. 2d 391, 335 P.2d 1035(1959) ; Gould v. Callan, 127 Cal. App. 2d 1, 273 P.2d 93 (1954).2 Gill v. Mission Say. & Loan Ass'n, 236 Cal. App. 2d 753, 46 Cal. Rptr. 456
(1965); Radunich v. Basso, 235 Cal. App. 2d 826, 45 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1965) ; Spaziani
v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963); Collins v. Home Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 205 Cal. App. 2d 86, 22 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1962). Matthews v. Hinton, 234
Cal. App. 2d 736, 44 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1965) is usually cited in this connection, but will
not be discussed here. The case involved "subordination" by a lessor of his reversionaryinterest to enable the lessee to obtain a loan to improve the property. Lessor joined
in the execution of the deed of trust but not the promissory note. Lessor therefore
hypothecated his property to secure a debt not personal to himself and could not
complain when the lender, upon default and notice, foreclosed. It is submitted that this
direct hypothecation is not the same thing as the waiver of priority which is involvedin the cases cited first above, although it might produce similar results. Matthews is
remarkable, however, for a bit of dictum which lends unnecessary support to the rulein Gill: that the lender has no duty of care to supervise the expenditure of loan funds
in accord with the terms of a contract (the subordination agreement) with which it is
not in privity. See also text accompanying note 24 infra to the effect that privity has
no application to a discussion of priorities.
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discussed, along with one case' from a trial court, from the stand-
point of seller's remedies.
The usual context in which the subordination clause appears
involves sale of an undeveloped tract of land to a buyer/developer
who is acquiring for residential subdivision or commercial develop-
ment. The seller will often prefer to take in cash only thirty per cent
or less in the year of sale in order to spread his taxes, taking back
a purchase money deed of trust from the buyer to secure the
remainder. In actual fact it would appear that the individual seller
usually does not discount this deed of trust.4 A seller who subordi-
nates his deed of trust to construction financing does so on the
theory that the improvements, when completed, will actually add
to rather than detract from his security. Furthermore, he can usually
obtain a higher price for his land if he agrees to subordinate.
The buyer seldom wishes to postpone construction until the full
purchase price of the land has been paid nor does he wish to divert
any more cash (if he has it) than is necessary toward payment of
the purchase price of the land. He may obtain an option to purchase
(embodying the subordination clause) and negotiate his construction
financing prior to exercising the option. The construction loan es-
crow will often parallel the land sale escrow.
Under the earlier cases, if the construction financing which the
buyer was able to obtain appeared unsatisfactory or if for any other
reason the seller felt unsure of his security, he might repudiate the
executory contract of sale and resist specific performance on the
ground that the subordination clause contained in the contract was
indefinite, uncertain, or perhaps even unconscionable.5 If the subor-
dination clause was cast in the "automatic" form, uncertainty might
not be far from unconscionability.
In Burrow v. Timmsen' the court relaxed the requirements for
specific enforceability stating that if the material terms (maximum
loan amount, maximum interest, maximum period of the loan and
source of the loan funds) were expressly stated and other terms were
reasonably ascertainable, the specific performance of the land sale
contract containing the subordination agreement would be granted.
7
8 Kiles v. Dobrow, Civil No. 128182, Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Calif.,
Dec. 31, 1965.
4 Hetland, Real Property & Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the Law,
53 CAI.F. L. REv. 151, 160 n.37 (1965).
5 Magna Dev. Co. v. Reed, 228 Cal. App. 2d 230, 39 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1964);
Kessler v. Sapp, 169 Cal. App. 2d 818, 338 P.2d 34 (1959); Roven v. Miller, 168 Cal.
App. 2d 391, 335 P.2d 1035 (1959) ; Gould v. Callan, 127 Cal. App. 2d 1, 273 P.2d 93
(1954).
6 223 Cal. App. 2d 283, 35 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1963).
7 Id. at 288-89, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72. The parties, however, expressly con-
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Subsequent decisions 8 have followed the Burrow rule, indicating that
the seller may not in the future walk away from the contract should
the terms of the subordination clause appear to be inadequate for
his protection.' Litigation involving executed subordination agree-
ments may therefore be expected to increase.
If the total encumbrance is not excessive in relation to the value
of the land when improved, and if the improvements are completed
and sold or leased without incident no problem arises. But it is in-
herent in the nature of the transaction that until such time as the
improvements are complete, or almost complete, the land will be
overencumbered. If therefore the buyer/developer, prior to comple-
tion of construction, becomes insolvent and defaults on his payments
to the construction lender, the seller faces the almost certain danger
that his security will be at least partially, if not totally, exhausted to
satisfy the now prior lender.
If the construction is not substantially complete at the time of
buyer's default, seller is probably in no position to foreclose his
junior lien. In most cases this would necessitate his sinking large
sums in the project. Furthermore, part of the construction loan
funds may have been diverted by the buyer for purposes of his own,
such as paying his other creditors, and the land may be so over-
encumbered that the seller may not be able to finish the project at a
profit even if he should want to foreclose. Seller's foreclosure is,
therefore, usually not an acceptable remedy. The seller cannot pro-
ceed against the buyer even if the latter is solvent due to the bar of
the anti-deficiency legislation. 1° Seller is usually in a position where
tracted with reference to the "usual . . . form of subordination" of a particular title
company. See also Cummins v. Gates, 235 Cal. App. 2d 532, 540, 45 Cal. Rptr. 417,
422 (1965); Stockwell v. Lindemann, 229 Cal. App. 2d 750, 756, 40 Cal. Rptr. 555,
558 (1964). Absent an express contractual reference supplying a means by which
additional terms could be ascertained with a fair degree of certainty, would the
Burrow rule still apply? See Magna Dev. Co. v. Reed, 228 Cal. App. 2d 230, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 284 (1964). The agreement in the latter case was defective for failure to state
essential terms. For a discussion by Justice Molinari see Magna Dev. Co. v. Reed,
supra at 236, 242, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 289, 293.
S Cummins v. Gates, 235 Cal. App. 2d 532, 45 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965); Stockwell
v. Lindemann, 229 Cal. App. 2d 750, 40 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1964).
9 Cummins v. Gates, 235 Cal. App. 2d 532, 540-41, 45 Cal. Rptr. 417, 422 (1965);
Stockwell v. Lindemann, 229 Cal. App. 2d 750, 756-58, 40 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557-60(1964). These cases appear to relax even the terms stated to be essential in Burrow,
leaving maximum amount and rate of interest the only material terms, provided a
method is stipulated in the contract ("upon such terms as are required by the lender
thereof") or evidence of custom and usage is available to ascertain additional terms.
It must be remembered that the agreement can always be avoided if it can be shown to
be merely an agreement to agree.
10 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 580b. As to whether Bargioni v. Hill, 59 Cal. 2d 121, 28
Cal. Rptr. 321, 378 P.2d 593 (1963) and Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35,
27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97 (1963) signal the advent of a more relaxed § 580b
rule in the future, see generally Hetland, supra note 4, at 159-65.
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his only acceptable remedy is to proceed against the lender to re-
establish the original priorities.
In Collins v. Home Savings and Loan Association" seller sued
for a declaratory judgment respecting the priority of his purchase
money deed of trust vis-4-vis the lender's construction loan deeds
of trust. As the lender had already foreclosed, seller prayed for an
accounting of the proceeds of the trustee's sale. Seller obtained
judgment against the lender in the full amount of the debt under-
lying seller's deed of trust. The reasoning of Collins is nowhere made
clear, but seller's deed of trust was nevertheless accorded priority.
This declaration of priority is the basis of a judgment which may
not properly be called damages. The court makes the point that the
subdivision had been completed and the houses sold prior to the
time of suit. Rather than permitting these subsequent transactions
to be disturbed by the seller, the court appears to have substituted a
lien on the proceeds of the lender's trustee's sale for a lien on the
land.
The declaration of priority is based on the reasoning that the
subordination agreement was expressly conditional. The Collins
facts show three separate conditional elements; unfortunately for
the purpose of analysis an identification of the controlling condition
was not necessary to the decision. In a different factual context the
operative effect of each of these conditions might be significant. The
conditions of the subordination clause were summarized by the court
as follows:
1. Condon Co. was to borrow not to exceed 80 per cent of the value
of the lots as shown by the Certificate of Reasonable Value issued
by the Veterans Administration "in connection with a construction
loan obtained for the purpose of constructing on each lot a dwelling
house with usual appurtenances";
2. The interest on such loan was not to exceed 7 per cent per annum;
3. Sellers' (respondents') deed of trust was subordinated to the lien
of the construction loan obtained for the purpose above specified;
4. The full face amount of the construction loan should be conclusively
deemed to have been used for construction purposes;
5. Sellers (respondents) would reconvey each lot (162 in all) so as to
release it from the lien of their trust deed upon payment to them of
$2,000 per lot, each such $2,000 to be applied toward payment of the
obligation secured by the trust deed.
12
The agreement was later modified by adding the language "and lot
improvements thereto'1l 3 to item one. In addition the seller's deed of
11 205 Cal. App. 2d 86, 22 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1962).
12 Id. at 89-90, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The effect, if any, of item 4 was not men-
tioned in the opinion and is beyond the scope of this discussion.
13 Id. at 90, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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trust provided that the lender should take back individual deeds of
trust on each lot. 4 In fact the lender took back three blanket deeds
of trust on three portions of the subdivision. An attempted second
subordination agreement authorizing the three blanket deeds of
trust was held invalid for lack of consideration. The emphasis on
this point in the case indicates a vital assumption by counsel that
prior to the execution of the second agreement no subordination had
been achieved. The court's failure to rule directly on this point may
indeed be due to this view of the case taken by counsel. In theory
the assumption is correct. If it was in fact expressly made a condi-
tion that the construction loan was to be secured by individual
deeds of trust on each of the lots, then the loan never conformed to
the terms of the subordination agreement and the lender never did
achieve priority. The conclusive effect of this line of reasoning is
somewhat dimmed by the argument that this provision of the agree-
ment was not material to the protection of seller's rights. Certainly
it would hamper the partial reconveyances called for in the subor-
dination agreement, but this is after all the buyer's problem.
The second conditional element in Collins is the interest pro-
vision. The maximum rate of interest was not to exceed seven per
cent. Lender charged six per cent plus 13 1/2 "points," or percent-
age loan fee, for placing the loan. Testimony heard at the trial
indicated that the loan fee was excessive, perhaps unconscionable,
and that the lender had at least sufficient knowledge of facts which
would put one on notice that the borrower did not have sufficient
capability to carry out a project of this size. 5
A determination of whether "points" charged for a construc-
tion loan are interest has not been made in this context by the Cali-
fornia cases and was not made in Collins. Cases'" interpreting the
California usury law applicable to private lenders, however, have
treated loan fees as interest. If points are considered interest, then
the total cost of the loan including both interest and loan fees can-
not exceed the maximum specified if the lender is to achieve prior-
ity.17 It is arguable, of course, that the contracting parties did not
intend that points should be included in interest. If they did so
intend, the seven per cent rate is unreasonable." But it is also
possible to take the view that loan fees were not contemplated by
14 Id. at 92, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
15 Id. at 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 821. Plaintiff's cause of action against the lender for
fraud was, however, decided in favor of the lender.
16 E.g., Williams v. Reed, 48 Cal. 2d 57, 307 P.2d 353 (1957) and cases cited
therein.
17 As to maximum amount of loan principal, see e.g., Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v.
Mercury Builders, 124 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
18 But what of the more usual 9% figure?
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the agreement at all,'9 but were to be paid out of pocket by the bor-
rower to be later set off against his profit. In practice, however, this
does not happen. The lender normally subtracts the loan fee, or
part of it, from the first loan payment.
This suggests another point of view regarding "points" which
may indeed have been the view adopted in Collins. If loan fees were
not contemplated by the agreement, but were to be paid by the
borrower, the payment of loan fees out of the construction loan
funds constitutes a misapplication of funds in contravention of
restrictions on their use, to be considered along with other possible
misapplications such as lot advances, payment of subcontractors and
materialmen for previous projects and excessive builder's profits.
The misapplication of funds in Collins is detailed by the court
in its opinion:
1. $86,940 for loan fee or "points"
2. $75,000 lot advance, plus interest and fee, or $76,420
3. $158,607.36 paid to the parent company of the borrower as a fee
for supervising construction.
20
The court then says that as to the above items the construction loan
was not prior. This determination must be based on a finding that
the conditional language in the subordination agreement is expressly,
or is interpreted as, pro tanta conditional. In other words, the seller
has agreed to subordinate his purchase-money deed of trust to a
construction loan only to the extent that the loan funds are applied
to the purpose stated in the agreement.
Such a holding is quite reasonable if the language of the agree-
ment itself will support such an interpretation. Alternatively, what
would be the effect of language creating an absolute condition avoid-
ing the subordination entirely rather than pro tanto? The point was
not discussed by the court; fortunately for the seller, the total
amount of funds misapplied exceeded the amount of his deed of
trust. Decisions in other jurisdictions, 21 however, and dictum in one
California case22 indicate that where misapplication of funds is the
19 "Points" are not part of the principal and probably are not part of the interest.
That "points" are not contemplated at all absent a specific provision therefore, see
Lehnert v. Notlim Realty Corp., 251 N.Y. 340, 167 N.E. 463 (1929); Claypool v.
German Fire Ins. Co., 32 Ind. App. 540, 70 N.E. 281 (1904).
20 205 Cal. App. 2d 86, 91 & nn.2 & 3, 92, 22 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820 & nn.2 & 3
(1962).
21 Lehnert v. Notlim Realty Corp., 251 N.Y. 340, 167 N.E. 463 (1929); Albert
& Kernahan v. Franklin Arms, 104 N.J. Eq. 446, 146 A. 213 (1929); Claypool v.
German Fire Ins. Co., 32 Ind. App. 540, 70 N.E. 281 (1904); Joralman v. McPhee,
31 Colo. 26, 71 Pac. 419 (1903). Contra, Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Plewe, 202 Ia. 79,
209 N.W. 399 (1926).
22 W. P. Fuller Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac. 1027 (1920).
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operative fact, subordination will be avoided only to the extent of
such misapplication. 23
Although in a future case this might not afford complete satis-
faction to the seller, the rule is probably consistent with the expecta-
tions of the parties. Seller is agreeing to take some risk, even if the
full amount of the construction loan is applied to the proper pur-
pose.
It is to be noted that none of the arguments for failure of subor-
dination depend for their effect on the contractual privity of the
lender. The lender is best described as a third party beneficiary of
the subordination agreement between buyer and seller. He may fail
to gain priority, or having gained it may lose it, if the buyer fails to
perform a condition upon which the subordination depends. Further-
more, lender's knowledge of the buyer's misapplication or intended
misapplication of funds is immaterial in the absence of fraud. By the
same reasoning lender's lack of knowledge of the terms of the
subordination agreement is a matter of lender's risk and can have no
effect on priorities, assuming the seller has complied with the record-
ing act. The latter point is illustrated by way of dictum in Spaziani
v. Millar.2 4
To what extent need a subordination agreement be expressly
conditional in order to be relied upon to re-establish seller's priority?
In Spaziani, plaintiff attempted to apply the Collins reasoning to a
case predicated on a theory of negligence. The court clearly held
that no cause of action in negligence could be sustained against the
lender who owed no duty of care arising from common law, con-
tract or statute toward the seller. The case is unfortunate in many
respects. Although it would appear from the evidence that plaintiff
intended to create a conditional subordination agreement, her escrow
instructions and deposit receipt, the only memoranda of the land
sale contract, fail to support this interpretation.25 Instead, they give
the lender priority ab initio and not by a waiver by seller of a prior-
ity already obtained (both seller's and lender's liens were for
purchase money).
Plaintiff sold two lots with existing houses on the front portion
23 See cases cited note 21 supra. The Iowa decision was based on the reasoning
that the loan company had no duty to supervise expenditure of funds by the borrower.
Although the non-existence of a duty to supervise may be a correct proposition of law,
it is submitted that this has no application to a suit to determine priorities, provided a
valid condition to the original waiver had been created. The language is not quoted
but the trial court interpreted the waiver as conditioned upon use.24 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 680, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658, 665 (1963).
25 But see, Comment, Subordination of Purchase-Money Security, 52 CALMF. L.
REV. 157, 160 (1964).
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of each lot. It was understood between buyer and seller that buyer
intended to improve the rear portion of each lot and would obtain
a construction loan for that purpose. The deposit receipt and escrow
instruction which plaintiff signed showed that the rear portion of
each lot was to remain free and clear. They also showed that plain-
tiff agreed to take a second deed of trust on the front portion of each
lot, leaving the buyer free to place a first deed of trust on this part
of the property. Plaintiff urged that the agreement between herself
and the buyer and the escrow instructions (which were ambiguous) 2
showed that she had agreed to take a first deed of trust upon the
entire property and to subordinate that to a construction loan,
whether upon the front or rear portions or both is not clear. What-
ever may have been the inducement for the sale, the court found
that no fraud had been perpetrated on her and that she had agreed
to take a second deed of trust without stipulating express conditions
regarding the first deed of trust to which she would subordinate.
She had, in effect, agreed not to be prior at all and it became there-
fore immaterial to decide whether she ever had been. Her theory
that the lender owed her a duty to inform her of its intentions or
alternatively to refrain from encumbering the property without her
knowledge and consent was therefore without a foundation and the
court's statement obiter that it would be immaterial whether lender
was a bona fide encumbrancer is therefore correct.
In the recent California case of Kiles v. Dobrow27 in the
Superior Court of Santa Clara County, the subordination agreement
upon which plaintiff relied to re-establish her priority was con-
siderably broader than the Collins agreement. In this case plaintiff
agreed to subordinate to a "construction loan," stipulating the maxi-
mum amount and rate of interest. Upon default of the borrower on
the construction loan, and notice by the lender of its intention to
foreclose, plaintiff sought a declaration of priority for her deed of
26 The relevant language in the escrow instructions is as follows:
First Deed of Trust to File: Construction loan to come.
Second Deed of Trust to File: Executed by Buyer to secure Note in amount
of $20,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum payable
monthly in favor of Mary Spaziani, a widow, Diana Spaziani, a single woman,
and Linda Gloria Spaziani, a single woman, mother and daughters all as
joint tenants, principal and interest payable in installments of $120.00 or more
on the - day of each month, beginning 30 days from close of escrow.
Interest credited to close of escrow.
Deeds of Trust are to cover the following described property: The South 150
feet of the North '2 of the West '/2 of the East V2 of Lot 705 ....
Balance of property to remain clear.
Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 674, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661 (1963). Although
the point is outside the scope of this comment it should be here noted that a nonsuit
as to the title company was reversed on a theory of negligence in failure to ascertain
with certainty and/or to follow seller's instructions.
27 Civil No. 128182, Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Calif., Dec. 31, 1965.
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trust to the extent that "points" had been taken out of the construc-
tion loan. The court held that plaintiff had agreed to subordinate
only to a "construction loan" and that "points" were not part of a
construction loan within the ordinary meaning of that term. The
decision seems at first blush to be consistent with the reasoning
in Collins, but two contrary arguments immediately suggest them-
selves. In Collins, express restrictions were placed upon the use of
the construction loan funds. The general term "construction loan"
was not relied upon as sufficient to create a condition. In light of the
usual principle in the law of contracts that language used to create
a condition must be clear and unambiguous and the equitable con-
cept that equity abhors a forfeiture, the language in Kiles seems too
loose to be construed as an express condition. True, the phrase "con-
struction loan" may be ambiguous, and considerable evidence was
received in the Kiles case as to the meaning of the term as under-
stood between the parties. But should not the resolution of the
ambiguity go to the question whether payment of a loan fee, or
"points," constitutes a misapplication of funds in contravention of
an agreement expressly conditional, rather than to whether the
agreement was in fact conditional?
Another objection to the Kiles decision may be found in the
reasoning of some of the older cases from other jurisdictions. Fol-
lowing the principle that conditions must be expressly stated,
numerous courts have held that conditions will be enforced only to
the extent of the language used.28 Where a purchase-money mortgage
is subordinated to a construction loan mortgage, it has been held
that the alteration in priorities is effective to the full amount ad-
vanced under the construction loan mortgage, whether entirely or
only partially used for construction.29 The rationale, of course, is
that the language used subordinates the lien of the purchase-money
mortgage to the lien of another particular mortgage, whether the
maximum amount of the subsequent mortgage is stipulated or not.8 °
This does not, however, empower the mortgagor to subordinate the
prior lien to more than one subsequent mortgage," nor apparently
to a mortgage securing a loan no part of which is used for the pur-
pose intended.82 The latter decision may be supported on the reason-
28 Albert & Kernahan v. Franklin Arms, 104 N.J. Eq. 446, 146 A. 213 (1929);
McConnell v. Mortgage Investment of El Paso, 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d 280 (1957);
Claypool v. German Fire Ins. Co., 32 Ind. App. 540, 70 N.E. 281 (1904).
29 Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Plewe, 202 Ia. 79, 209 N.W. 399 (1926); Katchen
v. Bregman, 5 N.J. Misc. 1084, 141 A. 586 (1927).
80 Albert & Kernahan v. Franklin Arms, 104 N.J. Eq. 446, 146 A. 213 (1929).
81 McConnell v. Mortgage Investment of El Paso, 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d 280
(1957).
32 York Mortgage Corp. v. Clotar Constr. Corp., 254 N.Y. 128, 172 N.E. 265
(1930). See Prentice v. No. American Title Guaranty Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 381 P.2d
645, 30 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1963).
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ing that the loan and mortgage are not those described in the subor-
dination agreement, the same reasoning that applies when the
construction loan is greater than the maximum amount specified in
the subordination agreement. Even if the language in Kiles, there-
fore, may be construed to be conditional, does it describe a partic-
ular loan lien, or does it place restrictions on use?
The matter is further complicated by cases, some which hold
that construction loan funds need not be traced to actual construc-
tion uses, holding that "points" are not part of a construction loan
and do not constitute funds "advanced under the mortgage."3
The recent case of Radunich v. Basso"4 resulted in a declara-
tion of priority of plaintiff's purchase-money deed of trust over a
deed of trust securing a loan for the purpose of making the down
payment to plaintiff. The decision of the trial court rested on a find-
ing of fraud. Buyer and his agents and associates represented to
seller that the lien of his deed of trust would not and could not be
subordinated to the lien of any loan except one made for the purpose
of land improvement or construction. Without informing seller (who
never saw or signed the escrow instructions) they proceeded to
obtain a loan to make the down payment and effected recordation of
the lender's deed of trust as a lien prior to seller's. Rather than
award damages for fraud (which would have been speculative) the
court declared seller's lien to be prior, certainly a more equitable
result.
The contract of sale, however, contained a subordination pro-
vision to the effect that seller's deed of trust was to be "subordinate
to land and improvement loan or loans."3 The trial court received
evidence as to the meaning of this language. The District Court of
Appeal held that the weight of this evidence, coupled with the
findings of fraud and the judgment of the trial court, constituted an
implied finding that the subordination clause applied only to loans
for land improvement and construction. Whether this finding leads
to the conclusion of law that the subordination language was ex-
pressly conditional is not made absolutely clear, but the language
itself would seem to support such an interpretation. In view of the
finding of fraud, the decision can be supported on two bases: Either
plaintiff's lien (a) was subordinated to a lien to which he did not
agree to subordinate (a case for declaration of priorities), or (b)
was subordinated to a lien to which he did not expect to subordinate
because the transaction had been misrepresented to him (a case of
88 Persky v. Puglisi, 101 Conn. 658, 127 A. 351 (1925).
84 235 Cal. App. 2d 826, 45 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1965).
85 Id. at 833, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 829. [Emphasis in original.]
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fraud). It is submitted that the decision should be the same on
either basis.
Note that in Radunich the lender was not and could not be a
bona fide encumbrancer. The loan was arranged prior to the actual
sale and during the time that seller was still the record owner of the
property. Furthermore the lender had knowledge that the loan funds
were to be used to make the down payment on the property. The
court held that this was sufficient to constitute notice to the lender
of facts which might affect his priority.
In order to complete the picture brief treatment must be
accorded to a recent California case, which, while not in point of
this discussion, serves to shed additional light on the problem of
seller's remedies. In Gill v. Mission Savings and Loan Association36
plaintiff seller proceeded on a theory of negligence. He sought to
impose upon the lender the duty to supervise expenditure of loan
funds to assure completion of construction in accordance with the
plans and specifications. In affirming the judgment sustaining a
demurrer to the complaint, the court held that in the absence of
privity between seller and lender no duty arose. Although the result
may be correct, it is submitted that absence of privity is not the
answer. The complaint did not allege that the duty was contractually
imposed or voluntarily assumed, nor that the seller relied on any
promise by the lender. The gravamen of the complaint rests squarely
on foreseeability; therefore the decision must be supported, if at all,
on grounds of public policy. In view of the court's express statement
that seller could have protected himself by the terms of his agree-
ment, it is unlikely that the rule represented by Gill will be soon
changed.
A few points bear remarking in connection with all of these
cases. The necessity for careful draftsmanship is all too apparent.
Express words of condition have been given effect by the courts and
there is no reason to suppose that they will not continue to be
given effect. Hence specificity of terms is all important. The courts
have gone as far as they probably will go in upholding a condition
where such was clearly the intent of the parties and can be supported
by the language used. Once language is construed to be conditional,
however, the court is faced with the added problem of interpreting
the meaning of the condition. What are its limitations? Is it condi-
tional absolutely, or pro tanto? Does it describe merely the incidents
of a particular loan or does it place restrictions on use of loan funds?
One of the more troublesome problems likely to continue for some
time is the absence of any mention of "points" in many of these
36 236 Cal. App. 2d 753, 46 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1965).
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agreements. Several approaches to this have been suggested which
may serve until such time as the courts have an opportunity to
decide a clear case. 7
The use of a three-way (or more) subordination agreement
which is signed by the lender is of doubtful value except as a pro-
tection from a bona fide encumbrancer argument. In light of the
court's decision in Gill it is unlikely that any duty to supervise ex-
penditure of construction loan funds can be imposed on the lender
without separate consideration. A properly drafted subordination
agreement more effectively assures supervision by the lender.
Jeanne L. Arthur
87 Several drafting suggestions and sample forms are set out in the following:
CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA LAND SECURITY AND
DEVELOPNMNT, 123-40 (1960); Fry, Subordination Provisions in Land Purchase Agree-
ments, 37 CALIF. S. BAR. J. 381 (1962).
